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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
credibility of his own witness by showing him to be unworthy of belief. However, since counsel was taken by surprise, he should be permitted to interrogate
as to prior inconsistent statements to refresh recollection, to draw out an
explanation, and to show the witness his error.
However, nowhere in this case does the Court make any mention of surprise
and nowhere does the opinion indicate that the district attorney made any
showing of surprise at the trial. The question was raised by counsel for
defendant in his brief on appeal, but the Court, for some reason chose not to
discuss it. Of course, a discussion of surprise was not absolutely necessary to
the holding of the case as the Court held that the prior inconsistent statements
were not used to refresh recollection, but it seems that some mention of surprise
was in order since it has been held to be a necessary element of the doctrine. 10
Therefore, whether the Court will in the future require a showing of the
"troublesome" requirement of surprise before permitting counsel to refresh the
20
recollection of his witness appears to be somewhat in doubt.

J. S. M.
CONDUCT OF COUNSEL IS REVERSIBLE ERROR
In People v. Steinhardt,21 the defendant, convicted of a felony,22 contended
that he was deprived of a fair trial. Defendant's trial lasted fifty-three days
during which time the district attorney insulted the defense counsel, 2 3 made
improper remarks to the defendant on cross examination,2 4 and introduced into
25
the record evidence completely unrelated to the subject matter of the action.
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction stating that the evidence clearly
19. People v. Purtell, 243 N.Y. 273, 153 N.E. 72 (1926). See Blum v. Munzesheimer,
66 Hun. 633, 21 N.Y. Supp. 498 (1892) ; and Colter v. American Merchant's Un. Ex. Co., 56
N.Y. 585 (1874), for dicta that limits the doctrine to instances in which the calling party is
surprised by his witness' testimony.
20. McCormick, supra note 5 at 72, where the author recommends the abolition of a
showing of hostility or surprise in line with his other argument that the trier of fact should
be allowed to use prior inconsistent statements as affirmative evidence of a material fact.
21. 9 N.Y.2d 267, 213 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1961).
22. Defendant was convicted of criminally buying and receiving stolen property and
of concealing and withholding stolen property under N.Y. Penal. Law § 1308.
23. Appellant's Brief, 7768 Cases & Points, Case 10, pp. 28-30:
"Now, your Honor, that stirring Sarah Bernhardt speech makes me want to
puke. ...
"The air that . . . [defense counsel] gives stinks to high heaven."
"I have seen desperate men trying cases but never as desperate as this.... [Defense counsel] now is fishing off the bottom of the barrel."
"Some time subconsciously the truth seems to come out of . . . [defense counsel's]
mouth."
24. Id. at 26:
"Well, sir, I am not allowed, due to the rules of evidence and due to the fact that
I am a District Attorney, to state to you now what you are. .. ."
25. In cross examination of the defendant's witness, the district attorney asked if
the witness had ever been convicted of a crime. In redirect examination, defense counsel
established that the"witness was a veteran of the Second World War, had fought and had
been wounded at the Battle of Anzio. These answers prompted the prosecutor on recross
examination to review his military history during the Second World War, and question
the witness exhaustively on the commanders, the terrain, and the fighting at Anzio. "Your
Honor, may the record show that I am a holder of the Purple Heart, and an Oak Leaf
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established the guilt of the defendant as found by the jury.26 The majority
believed the conduct of the prosecutor was improper but did not affect the
substantial rights of the defendant. The lone dissenter stated that the district
attorney's actions were highly prejudicial to defendant's right to a fair trial
and influenced the jury in their verdict. The Court of Appeals unanimously
reversed the Appellate Division's decision and declared that the aforementioned
27
conduct by the district attorney, plus the undue prolongation of the trial,
deprived defendant of a fair trial regardless of strong evidence of guilt.
Irrespective of a defendant's guilt or innocence, the New York courts have
traditionally endeavored to safeguard the accused's fundamental right to a fair
trial by jury.28 The division between the Appellate Division and the Court of
Appeals is indicative of the very essence of this difficult problem. The courts
are confronted with this question: Whether or not the jury was influenced in
their verdict by the prejudicial tactics utilized by counsel? Error is substantial
and warrants a reversal of the conviction when the court finds that the jury has
been influenced in reaching their verdict. 29 Mere errors in the technical aspects
of a trial are unavoidable, and it is recognized that these are insufficient to
constitute a reversal of conviction. 30 Although in the instant case the evidence
of guilt warranted a conviction, the reprehensible conduct of the prosecutor
turned the trial into a sham. Nevertheless, can it be stated that the Appellate
Division was unreasonable in its opinion in affirming the conviction? The court
has no standard whereby it can deduce the subjective intent of the jury in
attempting to ascertain whether the conduct of the prosecutor did in fact
influence the jury in their verdict. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals
cannot be denied their opinion because the atmosphere of the trial was
seemingly outrageous.
The instant case does not clearly define improper conduct on the part of
counsel which may influence a jury in their verdict. The case indicates that the
court will weigh the circumstances surrounding the trial in order to determine
whether the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial and will reverse a
Cluster to the Purple Heart, the holder of a Silver Star, the holder of the Bronze Star
Medal; Your Honor, I want the record to show the decorations which I hold as a result
of having served in the 3rd Infantry Division, 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, I & R
Platoon."
26. 11 A.D.2d 107, 201 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1st Dep't 1961).
27. An undue prolongation of a trial is not of itself a deprivation of due process so
as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. People v. Clemente, 8 N.Y.2d 1, 200 N.Y.S.2d 625
(1960).
28. People v. Meleczko, 298 N.Y. 153, 81 N.E.2d 65 (1948) (The Court of Appeals
reversed the conviction where District Attorney said in summation: "In my opinion the
police used remarkable restraint in not giving him [the defendant] his just dues.") See
also, People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1956); People v. Tassiello, 300
N.Y. 425, 91 N.E.2d 872 (1950); People v. Jackson, 7 N.Y.2d 142, 196 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1959).
29. People v. Sobieskoda, 235 N.Y. 411, 139 N.E. 558 (1923).
30. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 542 provides that after hearing the appeal, the court
must give judgment, without regard to technical errors or defects as to exceptions which
do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Prejudicial statements may affect the
substantial rights of parties if they affect the verdict.
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conviction, even though the evidence supports the verdict, if the error committed
was substantial. Apologies exchanged between counsel after stormy arguments
and instructions by the court will not rectify the impression created in the minds
of the jury from such abhorrent proceedings.
L. H. S.
CHARACTER EVIDENCE TO PROVE PARTICULAR RELEVANT TRAITS ADmISSIBLE

In People v. McDowell, °a the Court of Appeals reversed a conviction of
second degree assault, affirmed by the Appellate Division,3°b on the erroneous
exclusion of evidence. The excluded evidence dealt with defendant's reputation
for peacefulness in the community in which he resided and the alleged hostility
of the complaining witness.
The exclusion of the evidence regarding the hostility of the witness was
clearly error, the New York rule being ". . . that the hostility of a witness
toward a party, against whom he is called, may be proved by any competent
evidence"3oc
The leading case in New York on the rules governing the admissibility of
character evidence is People v. Van Gaasbeck,31 in which the Court reached
three conclusions. First, character evidence is admissible to prove only relevant
traits, i.e., in a murder charge, evidence as to peacefulness is competent but
soberness would not be; second, the evidence as to the relevant traits is not
admissible if it is based on the witness' personal knowledge rather than his
knowledge of the defendant's reputation in the community; and third, negative
testimony is competent, i.e., having known him for thirty years and not having
heard anything contrary to a good character about him is admissible to give rise
to an inference of good reputation.
In Van Gaasbeck, two witnesses, who had known the defendant for twentyfive to thirty years, were called. The first was asked, "What do you say his
reputation is?" The objection was that there was no foundation and that it was
not the proper way to show character. The second was asked, "What do you say
of it?" Both questions were excluded upon objection. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals looked to the testimony immediately preceding the first question which
had established that the witness knew defendant's reputation for peacefulness.
This served to limit the question to a particular, relevant trait, in which case it
was proper. In view of the testimony of the second witness that he knew
defendant as being a peaceful, quiet man, the Court held the second question
properly excluded as probing not reputation but personal knowledge.
In the instant case, it appears that two of the questions properly excluded
were: "Are you familiar with his general reputation?" and "Do you know the
general reputation of the defendant?" These questions are too broad to be
30a.
30b.

9 N.Y.2d 12, 210 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1961).
10 A.D.2d 900, 202 N.Y.S.2d 267 (4th Dep't 1960).

30c. People v. Lustig, 206 N.Y. 162, 99 N.E. 183 (1912).
31.

189 N.Y. 408, 82 N.E. 718 (1907).

